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THE NOT-SO-SECRET BALLOT: HOW WASHINGTON
FAILS TO PROVIDE A SECRET VOTE FOR IMPAIRED
VOTERS AS REQUIRED BY THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION
Erik Van Hagen
Abstract: Secrecy in voting ensures that elections represent the true will of the people by
permitting a voter to freely express his or her convictions without fear of even the most
subtle form of influence, ridicule, intimidation, corruption, or coercion. Article VI, section 6
of the Washington State Constitution protects this secrecy by requiring the legislature to
provide every voter with a method of voting that will secure absolute secrecy in preparing
and casting his or her ballot. To that end, Washington election law requires that new
technology be implemented by January 1, 2006 to provide visually impaired voters with a
secret vote to the extent feasible. However, no similar provision exists for manually impaired
voters. Manually impaired voters include a wide range of individuals who lack the manual
dexterity to complete a paper ballot, such as amputees and individuals with cerebral palsy.
Manually impaired voters must waive their constitutional right to vote in secret and instead
must disclose their selections to a third party, usually in an open polling place where not only
the person assisting the voter hears the selection, but so does everyone in the vicinity. Voting
technology now exists and is approved for use in Washington that allows manually impaired
voters to vote in secret. This Comment argues that in light of the plain language of the
constitution, the framers' intent in requiring absolute secrecy, and persuasive precedent from
other jurisdictions, the Washington State Constitution requires that the legislature provide for
secrecy in voting to the extent feasible. By failing to provide a secret vote for manually
impaired voters to the extent feasible, the Washington legislature has not complied with the
requirements of article VI, section 6.
The ballot is dear to the people; for it uncovers men's faces and
conceals their thoughts. It gives them the opportunity of doing
what they like, and of promising all that they are asked.
- Cicero'
The Washington State Constitution ensures secrecy in voting by
requiring that the legislature provide all citizens with absolute secrecy
when preparing and casting ballots.2 The purpose of a secret vote is to
counteract a "great class of evils, including violence and intimidation,
improper influence, dictation by employers or organizations, the fear of
1. 1 WILLIAM FORSYTH, LIFE OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 339 (New York, Charles Scribner's
Sons, 6th ed. 1896).
2. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
Washington Law Review
ridicule and dislike, or of social or commercial injury,-all coercive
influence of every sort depending on a knowledge of the voter's political
action.",3 In addition, a secret vote ensures that elections represent the
"free and honest expression of the convictions of every citizen."4 A
recent Ohio case involving alleged voting fraud perpetrated against
disabled voters underscores the importance of secret voting.5 In 2000,
Cuyahoga County in Ohio employed John Jackson to assist physically
disabled voters in recording their votes.6 A coworker reported to the
elections board that she believed Jackson marked ballots in a manner
inconsistent with the voters' wishes.7 For example, one disabled voter
said she told Jackson she wanted to vote for every Democratic candidate
on the ballot, 8 yet Jackson selected Republican presidential candidate
George W. Bush.9 A grand jury indicted Jackson on five counts of ballot
tampering.' 0 On the heels of this historically close presidential election,11
and the 2004 Washington State gubernatorial election-the closest in
United States history,12-fair and accurate elections have never been
more important.
Article VI, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution requires
that the legislature "provide for such method of voting as will secure to
every elector absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his ballot."'' 3
This provision obligates the legislature to enact laws to protect and
preserve voting secrecy.14 Thus, the legislature is responsible for
3. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT SYSTEM AS EMBODIED IN THE
LEGISLATION OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES 52 (2d ed. 1889).
4. Id. at 53.
5. See State v. Jackson, 811 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ohio 2004) (stating that defendant was charged with






11. Richard L. Berke, Bush Barely Ahead Of Gore In Florida As Recount Holds Key To The
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at Al.
12. See Chris McGann & Lewis Kamb, GOP To Fight Gregoire Victory; Democrat Wins Second
Recount By 130 Votes, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
13. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
14. Cf Tellevik v. 6717 100th St. S.W., 83 Wash. App. 366, 378, 921 P.2d 1088, 1095 (1996)
(holding that WASH. CONST. art. XIX, § 1, which requires that legislature "shall protect by law from
forced sale certain portion of the homestead and other property of all heads of families," imposes
duty on legislature to protect homesteads at minimum level established by constitution), review
denied, 133 Wash. 2d 1029, 950 P.2d 476 (1998). Article VI, section 6 establishes a similar
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providing voters with a voting method that will ensure absolute
secrecy. 
15
However, despite this constitutional requirement, Washington
election statutes do not include any provisions for a secret vote for
manually impaired voters. 16 Beginning January 1, 2006, each county
must provide accessible voting technology, to the extent feasible,17 that
will enable visually impaired voters to vote without the assistance of a
third party.18 However, no similar provision exists for manually impaired
voters. 19 As a result, manually impaired voters who are unable to use the
provided voting technologies must disclose their votes to a third party in
order to cast their ballots.2 °
This Comment argues that the Washington State Constitution requires
that the legislature provide every citizen, including manually impaired
citizens, with the ability to vote in absolute secrecy to the extent
feasible. 21 This "secrecy to the extent feasible" requirement reflects the
framers' intent and derives from (1) the plain language of the
Washington State Constitution; (2) the historical context of the
constitutional provision; and (3) other states' interpretations of similar
constitutional provisions.22 Because the Washington Secretary of State
has now approved the use of accessible direct recording electronic
(DRE) voting systems, which enable manually impaired voters to vote in
secrecy,23 the legislature must require counties to provide accessible
requirement that the legislature "shall provide for such method of voting as will secure to every
elector absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his ballot." WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
15. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
16. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(1) (2004) (providing only visually impaired voters with
right to secret ballot through various devices such as Braille or audio ballot). The 2004 Revised
Code of Washington contains two sections numbered 29A. 12.160. One is in effect until January 1,
2006; the other is in effect after January 1, 2006. Id. This Comment refers to the latter.
17. See id. § 29A.12.160(2)-(3) (providing that secret vote for visually impaired voters can be
accomplished when county upgrades voting technology and is contingent on available funding).
18. Id.
19. This Comment defines "manually impaired" to include any impairment of motor skills that
limits manual dexterity and makes it difficult or impossible to clearly and independently complete a
paper ballot, such as an optical scan or punchcard voting system. This definition includes
individuals with impairments such as cerebral palsy, quadriplegia, amputation(s), and other
impairments.
20. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240 (noting that voters unable to complete their ballots may
vote with assistance of third parties).
21. See infra Part IVA.
22. See infra Part IV.A. 1-.3.
23. See Am. Ass'n of Disabled People v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
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DREs to the extent feasible.24 By neglecting to provide for manually
impaired voters in the requirement that counties implement accessible
technologies, 25 the legislature has not fulfilled its obligation to provide a
secret vote to the extent feasible to every citizen as required by the
Washington State Constitution.26
Part I of this Comment discusses how new technologies, specifically
accessible DREs, enable manually impaired voters to cast secret ballots
and also provides an overview of current Washington law related to
voting by disabled individuals. Part II examines the rules for interpreting
the Washington State Constitution as outlined by the Washington State
Supreme Court. Part III discusses article VI, section 6 of the Washington
State Constitution, including the plain meaning of the provision, the
historical circumstances in which it was adopted, and case law from
other jurisdictions that have interpreted similar provisions. Finally, Part
IV argues that the legislature's failure to sufficiently provide manually
impaired voters with a secret vote violates the secrecy to the extent
feasible requirement of article VI, section 6 of the Washington State
Constitution.
I. WASHINGTON DOES NOT PROVIDE MANUALLY
IMPAIRED VOTERS WITH A SECRET VOTE
Technology currently exists that would enable manually impaired
voters to vote secretly.27 The Washington Secretary of State has certified
this technology for use in Washington elections; 28 however, current laws
do not require that counties make this technology available to manually
impaired voters, despite the constitutional provision securing absolute
secrecy for all citizens.29 Although Washington election laws provide
visually impaired voters with a secret vote to the extent feasible,30 no
("Only with the use of these devices [accessible DREs] may such disabled voters, for the first time,
vote independently and in private.").
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(l).
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1125 (noting that DREs enable disabled voters to vote
secretly).
28. SAM REED, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE EXAMINATION OF AN [sic] DIRECT
RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTE TALLYING SYSTEM (2003), available at http://www.secstate.wa.gov
/elections/certification/JBC_HARTINTERCIVICeSlate3000.pdf.
29. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(1)-(3).
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similar provision exists for those who are manually impaired.3' Thus,
manually impaired voters who are not fortunate enough to live in a
county that has independently implemented accessible DRE voting
systems are forced to utilize the current statutory framework and receive
the assistance of a third party when voting.
A. New Voting Technology Approved for Use in Washington Allows
Manually Impaired Voters to Cast Their Votes Secretly
A DRE system is a new voting technology that, for the first time,
enables manually impaired citizens to vote in secrecy.32 When equipped
with accessible technologies, such as "sip and puff' devices or "jelly
switches," a manually impaired voter can cast his or her vote in secret.
33
A sip and puff device allows manually impaired individuals to cast their
ballots by breathing into the device.34 A jelly switch is a switch roughly
two inches in diameter that a manually impaired person can activate with
a hand, finger, or pencil because it is sensitive to small amounts of
pressure. 35 A disabled voter can also use a mouth stick to make
selections on a DRE touchscreen.36
The Washington Secretary of State has certified DRE systems that
include accessible technology allowing manually impaired voters to vote
in secrecy.37 The Washington Secretary of State must certify a voting
38
system before a county can use the system in a Washington election.
The Secretary may certify only those voting systems that meet specific
requirements, including the requirement that the voting system secures
secrecy.39 Counties may choose to use any certified voting device.
4 0
Following the Secretary of State's certification of DRE systems,
Skamania, Yakima, Clallam, Okanogan, and Snohomish counties
31. See id. (providing accessible voting for blind and visually impaired voters but not manually
impaired voters).
32. See Am. Ass'n of Disabled People v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
33. Id.
34. Am. Ass'n of People With Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 n.2 (M.D. Fla.
2003).
35. Id.
36. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
37. REED, supra note 28.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.050 (2004).
39. Id. § 29A.12.080.
40. See id. §§ 29A.12.010-.020.
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implemented DRE systems in all or some polling locations.
B. Washington Statutes Do Not Require a Secret Vote for Manually
Impaired Voters
Washington election laws do not provide manually impaired voters
with a secret vote to the extent feasible.42 Most counties currently use
optical scan ballots that require the voter to manually complete a paper
ballot.43 As a result, a manually impaired voter who wishes to vote at a
polling place must rely on the disabled voter assistance statute that
permits one official from each party or a person of the voter's choosing
to assist the voter in casting his or her ballot.44 Washington's disabled
voter assistance statute does not require third persons to provide this
assistance in private or in an area removed from other voters at the
precinct.45 Thus, a manually impaired voter discloses his or her choice
not only to the assistants, but also potentially to others in the vicinity.
46
Washington counties have the authority to accommodate disabled
voters by implementing an optional disabled voting access period.47
Counties may provide for a disabled voting access period twenty days
before the election.48 During this time, disabled voters may vote early at
locations established by the county auditor.49 However, the disabled
voting period does not require that counties make DRE technology
available; therefore, the statute does not ensure a secret vote for disabled
41. See WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, ELECTIONS: VOTING SYSTEMS, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/
elections/votingsystems.aspx (last visited July 19, 2005) (listing voting systems used in every
county, including DREs).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.160(1) (providing accessible voting for visually impaired voters
but not manually impaired voters).
43. See WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 41; see also REPORT OF THE CALTECH/MIT VOTING
TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 18 (2001), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/
julyOl/JulyOlVTPVotingReportEntire.pdf (describing how voting with optical scan ballot is
similar to recording answers on standardized test).
44. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240.
45. See id. (permitting assistance to disabled voters, but not requiring that assistance be given in
secret or away from other voters). But cf MINN. STAT. § 204C. 15 (2004) (requiring that assistance
to disabled voters be conducted "in as secret a manner as circumstances permit").
46. See generally Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp 2d 1226, 1228-29
(M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that disabled electors had to vote in public room where others may
overhear their selections).
47. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 29A.46.010-.250.
48. Id. §§ 29A.46.030-.1 10.
49. Id. §§ 29A.46.010-.020.
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voters. 50 Furthermore, the existence of a disabled voting access period is
optional. 51 Thus, each county has the discretion not only to decide
whether to establish an access period for disabled voters, 52 but also to
decide the location and hours of this access period.53
Absentee voting provides another choice for manually impaired
voters.54 An absentee ballot allows the voter to make his or her
selections on a ballot that he or she receives prior to election day and
then return the ballot to election officials, usually by mail. 55 Absentee
voting is unlikely to provide secrecy to manually impaired voters
because voters who are unable to complete a paper ballot in secrecy at a
polling place would similarly be unable to complete the paper absentee
ballot without assistance from another person.56 Furthermore, absentee
voting requires voters to sign the return envelope,57 which may not be
possible for manually impaired voters.
In contrast, the Washington legislature requires, to the extent feasible,
that counties provide visually impaired voters with accessible
technologies to secure a secret vote.58 Beginning January 1, 2006, each
polling place in Washington must have at least one voting unit that
provides access to individuals who are visually impaired.59 This can be
50. See id. § 29A.46.130 (requiring that "disability access voting must be conducted using
disability access voting devices at locations that are acceptable and comply with federal and state
access requirements").
51. Id. § 29A.46.110.
52. Id.
53. Id. § 29A.46.120.
54. Id. § 29A.40.010 (permitting any Washington voter to vote by absentee ballot). In 2005, the
Washington Legislature permitted any county to conduct elections entirely by mail. Unlike earlier
versions of that bill, the bill that eventually passed the legislature makes no provisions for disabled
voting. Compare SHB 1754, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005), available at http://www.leg.
wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2005-06/Htm/Bills/House%20Bills/1754-S.htm (requiring counties that
conduct elections only by mail to also provide disabled voting access period prior to election), with
Act of 2005, ch. 241, § 1, 2005 WASH. SESS. LAWS 241 (omitting requirement of disabled voting
access period from bill that passed legislature), available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/
2005-06/Pdf/Bills/Session%2OLaw%202005/1754-S.SL.pdf.
55. REPORT OF THE CALTECH/MIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, supra note 43, at 36.
56. See Am. Ass'n of Disabled People v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp 2d 1120, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(noting that DRE systems let disabled voters vote secretly and independently for first time).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.091.
58. Seeid. § 29A.12.160(1).
59. Id. The legislature enacted this law to comply with the requirements of the federal Help
America Vote Act (HAVA). 42 U.S.C.A. § 15481 (West Supp. 2004). HAVA creates accessibility
requirements for disabled voters, but does not require DRE systems. HAVA requires accessible
voting technology for the disabled, including the visually impaired, that may come in the form of a
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achieved through a voting unit that utilizes "synthesized speech, Braille,
and other output methods., 60 The legislature mitigated the cost of such
an upgrade in voting technology by making compliance contingent on
the availability of funding and by permitting a county to postpone
compliance with the accessibility requirements until the next time the
county upgrades its voting system.6' In addition, federal funding has also
mitigated the costs of upgrading voting technologies. 62 Under the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA), Washington received over $62 million from
the federal government to upgrade voting technologies and improve
voting access for the disabled.63
In sum, Washington statutes do not provide absolute secrecy to
manually impaired voters despite the technological ability to do so. New
DRE voting systems accompanied with assistive technology allow
voters with manual impairments to vote in secret for the first time. The
Secretary of State has certified the use of these voting technologies in
Washington elections, and several counties have implemented DRE
systems as the exclusive voting option at polling locations for manually
impaired individuals. While Washington election laws mandate a secret
vote for visually impaired voters, they do not do so for manually
impaired voters.
II. WASHINGTON COURTS EFFECTUATE THE FRAMERS'
INTENT WHEN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
When analyzing the meaning of a state constitutional provision, the
DRE "or other voting system equipped for individuals with disabilities at each polling place." 42
U.S.C.A. § 1548 1(a)(3)(B); see 148 CONG. REc. S 10488, S 10507 (2002) (statement of U.S. Sen.
Christopher Dodd) (noting that disabled voting provision of HAVA "does not require that a
jurisdiction purchase a DRE to meet the accessibility requirement since jurisdictions may also
choose to modify existing systems to meet the needs of the disabled voter"); Christina J. Weis,
Note, Why The Help America Vote Act Fails To Help Disabled Americans Vote, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 421 (2005). In order to comply with HAVA, the Washington legislature chose not to
mandate DRE systems, but rather only to require accessible voting systems for the visually impaired
that consist of Braille ballots, audio ballots or other technology. See WASH. REV. CODE
§ 29A.12.160(4). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-379.7(d)(4) (2003) (requiring that DRE systems
be made available for disabled voters in every precinct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3506.19 (Supp.
2005) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 17-19-8.2(a) (2003) (requiring accessible voting technology for as
many disabled voters as possible through state of the art technology).
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(4).
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(2)-(3).
62. See42 U.S.C.A. § 15301.
63. WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, HAVA FUNDING SUMMARY, http://www.secstate.wa.gov/Elections/
pdf/HAVA%20Funding.pdf (last visited July 19, 2005).
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Washington State Supreme Court seeks to honor the intent of the
framers of the constitution.64 The court first examines the plain language
of the provision.65 If the plain language is clear, then no further inquiry
is required.66 If the plain language is ambiguous, Washington courts turn
to extrinsic evidence such as contemporaneous events and decisions
from other jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions.
67
In Washington Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough,68  the
Washington State Supreme Court applied this framework when
interpreting the Washington State Constitution.69 The court examined the
constitutionality of prison employment programs that were operated and
managed by private organizations. 70 The court considered whether these
programs violated article II, section 29 of the Washington State
Constitution, which prohibits contract prison labor programs.71 In
determining whether certain private prison labor contracts violated the
constitution, the court first examined the plain meaning of the provision
based on standard dictionary definitions.72 The court then explored the
historical context of the provision, which included an examination of the
records of the state constitutional convention, a discussion of trends in
other states at the time of the constitutional convention, the political
climate at the time of ratification, and the history of the Washington
prison system. 73 Finally, the court analyzed other states' interpretations
of similar constitutional provisions.74
64. See, e.g., State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wash. 2d 575, 579, 183 P.2d 813, 815 (1947)
(noting that in interpreting constitution, "courts are required to give effect to the intent and purpose
of the framers").
65. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42, 45 (2004).
66. State ex rel. Swan v. Jones, 47 Wash. 2d 718, 721-22, 289 P.2d 982, 984-85 (1955)
("[l]nterpretation is improper if the particular constitutional language or provision is clear and
unambiguous.").
67. See Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 493, 90 P.3d at 53.
68. 151 Wash. 2d 470, 90 P.3d 42 (2004).
69. See id. at 480-501, 90 P.3d at 47-57 (examining plain meaning of constitution, historical
events from time of ratification, and precedent from other jurisdictions).
70. Id. at 474, 90 P.3d at 44.
71. Id. at 477, 90 P.3d at 45.
72. Id. at 480, 90 P.3d at 47.
73. Id. at 484-92, 90 P.3d at 49-53.
74. Id. at 493, 90 P.3d at 53.
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A. Under the Yarbrough Framework, Washington Courts First Look
to the Plain Language in Interpreting the State Constitution
When interpreting a constitutional provision, courts must first look to
the plain language of the text and accord it "its reasonable
interpretation. ' ' 75  The plain language is the primary source of
interpretation because the constitution is an "expression of the people's
will."' 76 The court gives the words of the constitution their ordinary
meaning at the time of drafting.77 In examining the plain meaning of the
words of the constitution, Washington courts often rely upon dictionary
definitions, specifically those of The Century Dictionary,78 published in
the same year that the Washington State Constitution was ratified.79
Washington courts may not overlook the plain and unambiguous
meaning of the constitutional provision.80 If a court determines that the
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, then the
court engages in no further analysis. 8' Even if a court believes that a
provision in the constitution is too restrictive, the court must leave it to
the people to change the constitution through the amendatory process.82
Courts may not engraft an exception onto the constitution, even if it is
expedient to do so. 83
B. Courts May Analyze the Historical Context of a Constitutional
Provision When the Plain Language Is Ambiguous
Under Yarbrough, courts may look to the historical context that
surrounded the drafting of the constitutional provision.84 The historical
context includes historically contemporaneous events and proceedings
75. Id. at 477, 90 P.3d at 45 (citations omitted).
76. State ex rel. Albright v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 2d 767, 770, 394 P.2d 231, 233 (1964).
77. Id.
78. THE CENTURY DICTIONARY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC LEXICON OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1889) [hereinafter THE CENTURY DICTIONARY].
79. See, e.g., Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 481, 90 P.3d at 47 (relying on The Century Dictionary
to determine meaning of constitutional provisions); State v. Foster, 135 Wash. 2d 441, 477, 957
P.2d 712, 731 (1998) (same).
80. See State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 806, 399 P.2d 623, 626
(1965).
81. State ex rel. Swan v. Jones, 47 Wash. 2d 718, 721-22, 289 P.2d 982, 984-85 (1955).
82. See Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d at 806, 399 P.2d at 626.
83. See id.
84. See Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 485, 90 P.3d at 49.
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from the time of adoption.8 5 This consists of records of the constitutional
convention, the political climate at the time of ratification, and the
"public history of the times. ' '86
In addition, the court may derive the framers' intent from historical
facts surrounding the constitutional convention, such as the framers'
decision to employ language different from other constitutions.87 The
Washington State Supreme Court presumes that the framers' use of
specific and unique language in the constitution was intentional and thus
indicative of their intent.88 The Washington State Supreme Court gives
meaning to all words because many drafters of the Washington State
Constitution were lawyers and "appreciated the nuances of language.'
89
In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State,90 the Supreme Court of
Washington examined article IX, section 1 of the state constitution,
which provides that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders." 91 The court compared the Washington provision to analogous
provisions in other state constitutions that existed in 1889, but were not
worded as strongly as Washington's. 92  The court noted that
Washington's provision was unique and stronger than that of other state
constitutions, and that this stronger language was indicative of the
framers' intent regarding the importance of education in Washington.93
The court added that, "without question," the language of other state
constitutions was before the framers, and the court presumed that the
framers intentionally chose the stronger language.
94
85. Id.
86. See State ex rel. Mason County Lodging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 74, 31 P.2d 539, 543
(1934) (citing People ex rel. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 506 (1871)); see also
Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 485-87, 90 P.3d at 49-53 (discussing historical context courts consider
in interpreting constitution).
87. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 499, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (1978).
88. See id. at 499, 585 P.2d at 85 (noting that Washington's constitutional language is broader
than that of other states', which is indicative of framers' intent in crafting provision).
89. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 215, 949 P.2d 1366, 1379 (1998).
90. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
91. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
92. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 497-99, 585 P.2d at 84-85.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 499, 585 P.2d at 85; see also State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 374-75,
173 P. 35, 36-37 (1918) (noting that Washington's constitutional ban on separation of church and
state is stronger than other states, and that this "sweeping and comprehensive" language is
indicative of framers' intent to require strict separation of church and state).
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C. Under Yarbrough, the Court May Also Consider the Judicial
Interpretations of Similar Provisions in Other States
The Washington State Supreme Court often considers judicial
interpretations of similar constitutional provisions from other states
when interpreting the Washington State Constitution.95 The court looks
to the interpretations of similar constitutional provisions by other state
courts when neither Washington case law nor records of the
constitutional convention provide a clear indication of the framers'
intent in enacting a provision in the constitution.96 Decisions from otherjurisdictions are especially helpful to the Washington State Supreme
Court in cases of first impression. 97
In sum, to determine the framers' intent, the Washington State
Supreme Court first examines the plain language of the constitution. If
the plain language does not resolve the issue, the court will consider
other evidence to determine the framers' intent. This analysis includes
the records of the constitutional convention, the words chosen by the
framers, historically contemporaneous events, and judicial decisions
from other jurisdictions.
III. WASHINGTON'S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES ABSOLUTE
SECRECY IN VOTING TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE
Article VI, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution provides:
"All elections shall be by ballot. The legislature shall provide for such
method of voting as will secure to every elector absolute secrecy in
preparing and depositing his ballot., 98 In determining the scope of this
right, the court must analyze the plain meaning of article VI, section 6,
including the use of the word "absolute" to describe the level of required
secrecy.99 The Washington State Supreme Court has interpreted
95. See Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 493, 90 P.3d 42, 53
(2004).
96. Biggs v. State Dep't of Ret. Sys., 28 Wash. App. 257, 259, 622 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1981)("Since neither the case law of our state, nor the minutes of the constitutional convention are of
assistance in resolving the question at bench, we look to similar provisions in other state
constitutions for guidance."); see also Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 485-87, 90 P.3d at 49-53.
97. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119, 660 P.2d 738, 741 (1983) (noting that in cases of first
impression, Washington courts "look to other jurisdictions for information and guidance").
98. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
99. See Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 477, 90 P.3d at 45 (requiring that courts look first to plain
language of term when interpreting Washington State Constitution).
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"absolute" in a separate context to mean "without exception."'
00 An
analysis of the historical context of ratification of the constitution
demonstrates that article VI, section 6 requires stricter secrecy than
similar provisions in other state constitutions and goes beyond what is
necessary to implement the Australian ballot.10' However, laws passed
by the first legislature suggest that historically Washington's secrecy
requirement was not absolute. 10 2 In addition, courts in other jurisdictions
have interpreted similar constitutional provisions to require secret voting
only to the extent feasible.
10 3
A. The Plain Language ofArticle VI, Section 6 Had an Established
Meaning at the Time of the Washington Constitutional Convention
The plain meaning of "absolute" secrecy, according to dictionaries in
use at the time of ratification, is secrecy that is not subject to
exceptions. 0 4 The Century Dictionary defines "absolute" as "[flree from
every restriction; unconditional, ' 05 and "secrecy" as the "concealment
from the observation or knowledge of others."' 6 Thus, the phrase
absolute secrecy, as used in 1889, refers to a concealment from the
observation or knowledge of others that is unconditional and
unrestricted.
The Washington State Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of
absolute in another area of law in a manner consistent with the above
definition. 0 7 In Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner,0 8 a contract case, the
100. See Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 263, 2 P.2d 688, 690 (1931) (citing 28
C.J. 895).
101. See infra Part III.B.
102. See WASH. REV. CODE § 388 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240
(2004)) (permitting assistance to disabled voters unable to independently complete their ballots).
103. See, e.g., State ex rel. Braley v. Gay, 60 N.W. 676, 678 (Minn. 1894) (noting that secrecy
must be maintained "as far as possible").
104. See 1 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 21 (defining "absolute"); 5 THE
CENTURY DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 5454 (defining "secrecy").
105. 1 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 21. Another legal dictionary published in
1889 defined absolute as "[exclusive; without condition or incumberance; complete; perfect; final;
opposed to conditional, qualified, relative...." WILLIAM ANDERSON, A DICTIONARY OF LAW,
CONSISTING OF JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 8 (1889). Black's Law Dictionary
similarly defined absolute as "without condition, exception, restriction, qualification, or limitation."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 10 (1891).
106. 5 THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 5454 (1889).
107. See Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 263, 2 P.2d 688, 690 (1931) (citing 28
C.J. 895).
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Washington State Supreme Court defined an "absolute guaranty" in a
contract as a situation in which payment is "unconditionally promise[d]"
by the guarantor. 109 Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court has used
the term "absolute" in a manner similar to the dictionary definition:
unconditional and without exception.
B. The Framers Required Stricter Secrecy than Other Constitutions,
but the First Legislature Considered an Exception for Infeasibility
An analysis of the historical context surrounding the ratification of
article VI, section 6 demonstrates that the framers provided for stricter
secrecy in elections than that required by other states' constitutions, but
the first legislature considered an exception from the secrecy
requirement if it was infeasible for secrecy to be maintained." 0 The
framers' requirement that voters have absolute secrecy is a unique
provision; no other state constitution had such a strict constitutional
requirement in 1889.111 In addition, the framers' requirement of absolute
secrecy was beyond what was necessary to implement the Australian, or
secret, ballot system. 112 However, the first legislature passed a law
permitting assistance to disabled voters, suggesting an exception to
secrecy in cases where voting in secret is infeasible. 113
1. The Framers of the Washington State Constitution Provided for
Stricter Voting Secrecy Than All Other State Constitutions in 1889
Although the preservation of secrecy and election by ballot are
108. 164 Wash. 257, 2 P.2d 688 (1931).
109. See id. at 263, 2 P.2d at 690 (citing 28 C.J. 895).
110. See infra Part I1I.B.1-.3. This Comment looks to historical evidence outside the limited
records of the Washington State constitutional convention. Most of the original records and
proceedings of the convention were lost and only summaries of motions and votes exist. See
JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at vi-vii (Rosenow
ed., 1962). As a result, courts rely on newspaper coverage of the convention. State v. Rinaldo, 36
Wash. App. 86, 91, 673 P.2d 614, 617 (1983). These newspaper accounts do not provide detailed
information regarding the passage of article VI, section 6. See, e.g., TACOMA MORNING GLOBE,
August 13, 1889, at I (discussing passage of article VI, section 6, but omitting any details of debates
of constitutional convention or framers' intent in enacting this provision).
11. See infra note 115.
112. Compare N.D. CONST. art. V, § 129 (amended 1978) (current version at art. II, § 1)
(providing that elections be by "secret ballot"), with 1891 N.D. Laws Ch. 66 (implementing
comprehensive Australian ballot method of voting in North Dakota's first legislative session).
113. See WASH. REV. CODE § 388 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240
(2004)).
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common to nearly all state constitutions,14 Washington's guarantee of
absolute secrecy for all voters is unique. At the time of ratification, this
was the strictest requirement for voting secrecy among all state
constitutions. 1 5 Two states, Kentucky and Virginia, currently have
114. See ARTHUR S. BEARDSLEY, NOTES ON THE SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON 1889-1939, at 20 (1939).
115. When the Washington constitution was ratified, no other state constitution required absolute
secrecy in elections. Thirty-three state constitutions required a vote by ballot, four state constitutions
required a secret ballot or some other secrecy provisions, and four states did not require a vote by
ballot. Eight state constitutions were ratified after Washington's. Montana, North Dakota, and South
Dakota all ratified their constitutions on October 1, 1889, the same day as the ratification of
Washington's. Idaho's constitution was adopted by constitutional convention in August 1889, but
not ratified until November of 1889 and is therefore not included here.
Prior to the adoption of the Washington State Constitution, vote by ballot was required by: ALA.
CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 2; ARK. CONST. art. III, § 3, amended by ARK. CONST. amend. 50
(repealing ballot requirement and replacing with requirement that voting be by ballot or by voting
machine "which insure[s] the secrecy" of voters."); CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 5 (amended 1896
(requiring that voting "be secret")); COLO. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (amended 1946); CONN. CONST. of
1818, art. VI, § 7; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV, § 1; FLA. CONST. of 1886, art. VI, § 6; GA. CONST.
of 1877, art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VII, § 2; IND. CONST. art. II, § 13; IOWA CONST. art. II,
§ 6; KAN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended 1974); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 184; ME. CONST. art. II,
§ 1; MD. CONST. art. 1, § 1; id § 3 (amended 1977) (current version at art. 1, §§ 3, 6) (providing
penalties for bribery); MASS. CONST. ch. I, § 3, art. III ("Every member of the house of
representatives shall be chosen by written votes .... ); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. VII, § 2; MINN.
CONST. art. VII, § 6 (amended 1974) (current version at art. VII, § 5); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art.
VII, § 1; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. VIII, § 3; MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. IX, § 1; NEB. CONST. art.
VII, § 6 (amended 1920) (current version at art. VI § 6) (amended 1972); NEV. CONST. art. II, § 5;
N.H. CONST. pt. 2 art. 14 (amended 1984); N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. II, § 5; N.C. CONST. of 1876,
art. VI, § 5; OHIO CONST. art. V, § 2; PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (amended 1901 (requiring secrecy in
voting)) (amended 1967) (current version at art. VII, § 4); R.I. CONST. OF 1842, art. VIII, § 2; S.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. II, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (amended 1974); VA. CONST. of 1870, art.
III, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. III, § 3 (amended 1986 (requiring voting by "secret ballot").
Three states required a secret ballot or other secrecy protections: N.D. CONST. art. V, § 129
(amended 1978) (requiring elections to be by "secret ballot") (current version at art. II, § 1); TENN.
CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The general assembly shall have power to enact laws ... to secure the freedom
of elections and the purity of the ballot-box."); id. § 4 (requiring that popular elections be by ballot);
TEX. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (providing that legislature shall provide laws to "punish fraud and preserve
the purity of the ballot-box"). Vermont's constitution protected secrecy, but did not expressly
require a vote by ballot. VT. CONST. ch. II, § 34 ("[A]ny elector who shall receive any gift or reward
for his vote.., shall forfeit his right to elect at that time, and suffer such other penalty as the law
shall direct .... ); id. § 45 (requiring legislature to determine method for conducting elections).
Four states did not explicitly require voting by ballot: KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 15 ("In all
elections by the people ... the votes shall be personally and publicly given viva voce: Provided,
That dumb persons, entitled to suffrage, may vote by ballot.") (emphasis in original); N.J. CONST. of
1855, art. II (providing for suffrage, but without requirements of vote by ballot or secret ballot); OR.
CONST. art. II, § 15 ("In all elections by the legislative assembly, or by either branch thereof, votes
shall be given openly, or viva voce, until the legislative assembly shall otherwise direct."); W. VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("In all elections by the people, the mode of voting shall be by ballot; but the
voter shall be left free to vote by either open, sealed or secret ballot, as he may elect."); id. § 11
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specific constitutional provisions that permit assistance to the disabled in
completing their ballots." 6 In fact, Kentucky's fourth constitution,
ratified just two years after Washington's constitution, requires the
legislature to make provisions for blind, illiterate, and disabled voters." 17
Only Idaho's constitution, written at the same time as but ratified after
Washington's, provides voters with an "absolutely secret ballot."'" 8
Wyoming's constitution, ratified one month after Washington's,
provides for absolute privacy in the preparation of ballots and requires
that secrecy of the ballot be compulsory." 9
2. The Australian Ballot Method of Voting Does Not Require Absolute
Secrecy
The Australian, or secret, method of voting does not require an
explicit guarantee of absolute secrecy in the constitution. 120  The
Australian ballot is a method of voting by which the government prints a
uniform ballot that contains all the candidates' names and voters make
their selections in secret. 12' At the time that the Washington constitution
was drafted, states throughout the nation had adopted the Australian
ballot. 122 The Australian ballot was viewed in contrast to the only other
potential voting system, a viva voce, or voice vote. 23 At the time the
Washington State Constitution was ratified, a vote by ballot was
synonymous with a secret vote. 24 Constitutional provisions requiring
(requiring legislature to pass laws to "prevent intimidation, disorder or violence at the polls, and
corruption or fraud in voting").
116. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 3; Ky. CONST § 147.
117. See KY. CONST. § 147.
118. IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 1 ("All elections by the people must be by ballot. An absolutely
secret ballot is hereby guaranteed, and it shall be the duty of the legislature to enact such laws as
shall carry this section into effect.").
119. WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 11 ("All voters shall be guaranteed absolute privacy in the
preparation of their ballots, and the secrecy of the ballot shall be made compulsory.").
120. Compare N.D. CONST. art. V, § 129 (amended 1978) (current version at art. I, § 1)(providing that elections be by "secret ballot"), with 1891 N.D. Laws Ch. 66 (implementing
comprehensive Australian ballot method of voting in North Dakota's first legislative session).
121. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 50.
122. See id. at 23-49 (documenting dramatic expansion of Australian ballot throughout United
States in late 1880s).
123. See, e.g., Williams v. Stein, 38 Ind. 89, 91 (1871) (distinguishing between viva voce voting,
which is open and public, and voting by ballot, which is secret).
124. See id. at 92 (noting that "[t]he common understanding in this country certainly is, that the
term 'ballot' implies secrecy"); see also In re Massey, 45 F. 629, 634-35 (E.D. Ark. 1890) ("That
the word 'ballot' implies secrecy is unquestioned."); 26 Am. JuR. 2D Elections § 307 (2004) (noting
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voting by ballot imply a secret voting system that provides the voter
with a secret ballot free from inspection. 12 However, the framers of the.
Washington State Constitution went further and mandated not only that
voting be by ballot and in secret, but added the specific requirement that
every voter have "absolute secrecy in preparing and depositing his
ballot., 126 North Dakota, whose constitution was ratified on the same
day as Washington's, only requires secrecy in voting. 127 Yet the first
North Dakota legislature enacted a comprehensive Australian ballot
system similar to Washington's. 128 The constitutional requirement of
absolute secrecy is therefore not a condition precedent to legislative
adoption of the Australian ballot.
3. The First Legislature Emphasized Strict Secrecy but Seemed to
Anticipate an Exception to the Secrecy Requirement
In 1889-1890, the first Washington legislature implemented a
comprehensive Australian-ballot election law for the state that included
detailed procedures for secret voting. 129 In an address to a joint session
of the first legislature, Governor Elisha P. Ferry outlined the various
laws the inaugural legislature was required to pass as provided by the
constitution.' 30 One of these requirements was to enact an election
law.131 Governor Ferry reminded the legislature of the importance of
voting in absolute secrecy as provided in the constitution and said that
"[t]he safeguards to be thrown around the ballot box to prevent fraud and
corruption cannot be too many nor too stringent."'' 32 To that end, Senator
John R. Kinnear, who was part of the constitutional convention and
introduced a resolution at the constitutional convention requiring secret
that vote by ballot generally implies secret vote).
125. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Elections § 307 (noting that vote by ballot generally implies secret vote).
126. See WASH. CONST. art. VI, §6.
127. See N.D. CONST. art. V, § 129 (amended 1978) (current version at art. I, § 1).
128. 1891 N.D. Laws Ch. 66 (implementing comprehensive Australian ballot method of voting in
North Dakota's first legislative session).
129. See generally Act of March 19, 1890, ch. 13, 1890 Wash. Sess. Laws 400 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 363 (1891).
130. See E.P. Ferry, Message of Governor E.P. Ferry delivered to a Joint Session of the
Washington Legislature (November 22, 1889), in SENATE JOURNAL OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 45 (1890).
131. See id. at 47.
132. Id.
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voting in the constitution, 133 introduced an election law in the first
legislative session. 134 Senator Kinnear's bill was later combined with
another bill and substituted for a single election bill, 135 which the
legislature passed and the Governor signed into law. 136  This
comprehensive election law included a wide range of measures to ensure
secrecy, such as voting booths, guard rails to keep people away from
those engaged in voting, and official ballots to be furnished at the state's
expense. 137 In addition, the election law of 1890 provided that only
voters who declared they were unable to mark their ballot due to
disability or blindness could request assistance from election officials. 138
Thus, the first legislature provided that strict secrecy must be
maintained, but also provided an exception to secret voting in cases
where it was infeasible for the voter to vote in secret. 139
However, actions taken by the first legislature may be of limited
significance when interpreting constitutional provisions. 140 Washington
courts are not bound to consider actions or inactions of early
Washington legislatures to be reflective of the framers' intent.141 In
Seattle School District, the Washington State Supreme Court rejected the
idea that laws of the first legislature regarding school funding reflected
the framers' intent in making provisions for public education.1 42 The
court held that it was for the judiciary, not the legislative branch, to
133. See From Olympia, SEATTLE TIMES, July 16, 1889, at 1. Senator Kinnear's constitutional
resolution regarding secret voting was one of several introduced on the topic. The records of the
constitutional convention do not provide additional insight into how the Committee on Elections
and Elective Rights of the constitutional convention settled on the specific language of absolute
secrecy. See THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at
289 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed., 1999).
134. See SENATE JOURNAL OF THE FIRST LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 57-58
(1890) (noting that Senate Bill 7 by Senator Kinnear and Senate Bill 14 by Senator Seeley D. Hicks
were introduced in relation to elections).
135. See id. at 369 (noting substitution of Senate Bills 7 and 14 for Senate Bill 187).
136. See id. at 538 (noting signing of Senate Bill No. 187).
137. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 383-385 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 29A.44.060, .36.220 (2004)).
138. Id. § 388 (current version at § 29A.44.240).
139. Id.
140. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 514-15, 585 P.2d 71, 93 (1978)
(rejecting actions by first legislature, which included members of constitutional convention, as
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interpret the meaning of the constitution. 143 This is true even in cases
where members of the legislature also served as members of the
constitutional convention. 144 Thus, while some of the individuals who
were involved in drafting article VI, section 6 were also involved in
writing Washington's first election law, 145 this law did not necessarily
represent the framers' intent.' 46 However, this law does provide an
indication of the public history from the time of ratification. 
147
C. Courts in Other Jurisdictions Have Historically Required Voting
Secrecy to the Extent Feasible
When interpreting constitutional provisions similar to article VI,
section 6, courts in other jurisdictions "jealously" guard voting
secrecy. 148 These courts permit an exception to the secret voting
requirement when a voter cannot vote in secrecy, 149 but require the state
to secure secrecy to the extent feasible.' 50  The Washington State
Supreme Court has interpreted "feasible" to mean that which is either
capable of being accomplished'15  or capable of being accomplished
technologically and economically. 52 The "secrecy to the extent feasible"
interpretation relates as far back as 1894, when the Minnesota Supreme
143. Id. at 515, 585 P.2d at 93.
144. Id. at 514, 585 P.2d at 93.
145. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text (noting involvement of Senator Kinnear in
drafting article VI, section 6 and Washington's first election law).
146. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 514-15, 585 P.2d at 93.
147. See State ex rel. Mason County Lodging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 74, 31 P.2d 539, 543
(1934) (permitting Washington State Supreme Court to consider "public history" of times in
interpreting Washington constitution (citing People ex rel. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich.
499 (1871))).
148. See, e.g., Board v. Dill, 110 P. 1107, 1112 (Okla. 1910); Jones v. Glidewell, 13 S.W. 723,
725-26 (Ark. 1890).
149. See, e.g., State ex rel. Braley v. Gay, 60 N.W. 676, 678 (Minn. 1894) ("A fair interpretation
of the law requires the preservation, as far as possible, of secrecy as to the manner in which an
elector votes. But impossibilities cannot be required.").
150. See Jones v. Glidewell, 13 S.W. 723, 725 (Ark. 1890) (noting that voting statutes are
designed to secure "as perfectly as possible" secrecy in casting ballot); State ex. rel. Runge v.
Anderson, 76 N.W. 482, 485 (Wis. 1898) ("[T]he freest opportunity practicable is given under the
law for the voter to deposit such ballot so as to conceal his choices of candidates, indicated therein,
if he so desires."); State ex rel. Fenner v. Keating, 163 P. 1156, 1158 (Mont. 1917) (noting that
requirement that vote be by ballot is to "insure, so far as possible, the secrecy and the integrity of
the popular vote").
151. Miller v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 790, 794, 440 P.2d 840, 843 (1968).
152. See Rios v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 145 Wash. 2d 483,498-99, 39 P.3d 961, 969 (2002).
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Court upheld votes cast by disabled voters with the assistance of others
against challenges that the votes were invalid because they violated the
constitutional requirement of secrecy. 153 The court held that while
secrecy must be preserved, "impossibilities cannot be required .... To
demand anything approaching absolute secrecy in such cases would be
wholly impracticable."' 154 The court went on to say that although it
desired the secrecy demanded by the challenging party, this level of
secrecy was not possible. 155 Thus, the court permitted an exception to the
state's secrecy requirement in order to prevent the disenfranchisement of
disabled and illiterate voters. 156 Similarly, courts in Kentucky, 157
Michigan, 58 and Virginia 159 have justified an exception to the secrecy
requirement where a third party assists disabled or illiterate voters
because it was not feasible for these voters to vote in secrecy.
However, courts in other jurisdictions generally refuse to allow
individuals who can feasibly vote in secrecy to receive assistance or
otherwise breach secrecy when voting.' 60 For example, the South
Carolina Supreme Court struck down a law that permitted husbands to
accompany their wives into the voting booth as violating the
constitutional requirement of secrecy. 161 Similarly, courts in
Minnesota, 162 North Dakota, 163 Oklahoma, 164 and West Virginia' 65 have
153. Gay, 60 N.W. at 678.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.; see also Smith v. Dunn, 381 F. Supp. 822, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (noting that some
form of assistance is necessary to prevent blind voter from being otherwise deprived of right to
vote).
157. See Rogers v. Jacob, II S.W. 513, 514-15 (Ky. 1889).
158. See Ellis v. May, 58 N.W. 483, 485-86 (Mich. 1894).
159. See Pearson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Brunswick City, 21 S.E. 483, 485 (Va. 1895) (noting
that blind voters must compromise secrecy of ballot to prevent disenfranchisement).
160. See Board v. Dill, 110 P. 1107, 1114 (Okla. 1910); State ex rel. Edwards v. Abrams, 240
S.E.2d 643, 646 (S.C. 1978).
161. Abrams, 240 S.E.2d at 646.
162. See McEwen v. Prince, 147 N.W. 275, 277 (Minn. 1914) (noting that ballot secrecy is
destroyed when another person assists physically capable voter in casting his or her ballot).
163. See Grubb v. Dewing, 187 N.W. 157, 158 (N.D. 1922) (invalidating votes when election
official accompanied voters to election booth even though voters did not have disability, in violation
of constitutional secrecy requirements).
164. See Dill, 110 P. at 1114 (invalidating votes because election officials helped voters whom it
was not necessary to help because they were not entitled by statute to assistance in voting).
165. See Brooks v. Crum, 216 S.E.2d 220, 228 (W. Va. 1975) (noting that illiteracy is
precondition to obtaining assistance in voting).
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held that voting secrecy could not be breached in cases where the voter
was capable of casting his or her ballot secretly.
D. Other Jurisdictions Are Divided on Whether, in Light of New
Technology, Disabled Voters Must Be Provided with a Secret Vote
Courts interpreting secret voting requirements since the advent of
accessible voting technology have reached different conclusions as to
whether voting secrecy provisions require governments to provide the
new technology to disabled voters. 166 Three federal courts have
considered whether state secrecy provisions require states to provide
accessible technologies to enable disabled voters to vote in secrecy.
167
One court held that statutory voting secrecy provisions require
accessible technology for disabled voters.168 Conversely, two courts held
that constitutional voting secrecy provisions are satisfied through third
party assistance to disabled voters. 1
69
In Lightbourn v. County of El Paso,170 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas interpreted a Texas statute to provide
disabled persons with a statutory right to vote in secrecy.171 A group of
disabled voters sued the Texas Secretary of State for failing to provide
them with accessible voting technology that would allow them to vote in
secrecy.172 The court held that the state statute entitled the disabled
plaintiffs to a secret vote and that the state failed to observe this right
when it did not consider any possible modifications to voting technology
to accommodate persons with disabilities. 173 The court ruled that the
statute required the Secretary of State to take affirmative steps to ensure
166. Compare Lightbourn v. County of El Paso (Lightbourn 1), 904 F. Supp. 1429, 1432 (W.D.
Tex. 1995) (determining that blind voters are covered by statutory voting secrecy requirement and
thus state impermissibly failed to provide system which would allow visually impaired to vote in
secrecy), rev 'd on other grounds, 118 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 1997), with Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641,
653 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that constitutional voting secrecy under Michigan Constitution does
not require accessible technology for disabled voters), and Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v.
Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that requirement of "direct and
secret" vote under Florida Constitution does not require accessible technology for disabled voters).
167. See Lightbourn 1, 904 F. Supp. at 1432; see also Miller, 170 F.3d at 653; Smith, 227 F. Supp.
2d at 1287.
168. Lightbourn 1, 904 F. Supp. at 1432.
169. Miller, 170 F.3d at 653; Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
170. 904 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 118 F.3d421 (5th Cir. 1997).
171. Id. at 1433.
172. Id. at 1430-31.
173. Id. at 1432.
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that blind voters could vote in secrecy. 174 Thus, the court held that Texas
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because the state
failed to provide blind voters with the right to participate in the State's
voting program in a manner equal to that accorded to voters who are not
disabled. 175 However, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs failed to present an ADA claim because they failed to allege
that the Secretary of State received federal assistance 176 and because the
Texas election laws did not impose a duty on the Secretary of State to
ensure compliance with the ADA.' 77
In contrast to the analysis in Lightbourn, two other federal courts have
held that state constitutional secrecy provisions do not require the state
to implement accessible technologies to allow the disabled to vote in
secrecy.178 In 1999, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the Michigan constitution does not entitle disabled voters to a secret
vote. 179 The Michigan constitution requires that the legislature enact
laws to "preserve the secrecy of the ballot."' 8 ° The Sixth Circuit noted
that this provision is ambiguous and the Michigan State Supreme Court
could read the constitutional requirement of secret voting to require fully
174. Id. at 1431-32.
175. Id. The disabled voters argued that the failure to provide a secret vote as provided by state
law violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Lightbourn 1, 904 F. Supp. at 1430. The
ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). See
PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY § 10.1 (2004). The three federal
cases discussed in this Section are all based on violations of the ADA, but the basis for the alleged
discrimination is a denial of a secret vote as provided either by state statute or by a state
constitutional provision.
176. Lightbom v. County of El Paso (Lightbourn I1), 118 F.3d 421, 427 (5th Cir. 1997). The
parties eventually settled the lawsuit and the Texas Secretary of State made disability
accommodations as part of the settlement. See James C. Harrington, Pencils Within Reach and a
Walknan or Two: Making the Secret Ballot Available to Voters Who Are Blind or Have Other
Physical Disabilities, 4 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 87, 89 (1999).
177. See Lightbourn II, 118 F.3d at 432. The Fifth Circuit's holding that the ADA did not place a
duty on the Secretary of State left undisturbed the conclusion by the District Court that disabled
voters are included in the state's voting secrecy requirement. The applicability of the ADA to
secrecy in voting is outside the scope of this Comment. However, contrary to the Fifth Circuit, the
Middle District of Florida has held that the ADA is applicable to voting in secrecy. See Am. Ass'n
of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2004), stay granted by
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8349 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
178. Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 653 (6th Cir. 1999); Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities
v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
179. Miller, 170 F.3d at 653.
180. Id. at 649 (citing MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 4).
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accessible technology. 181 However, the court held that accessible
technology was not required because Michigan courts had previously
permitted assistance to disabled voters.' 82 In addition, the court reasoned
that the Michigan State Constitution did not require accessible
technology because the state legislature had interpreted the constitutional
provision preserving the "secrecy of the ballot" voting as not meaning
"absolute secrecy."'
183
Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
upheld Duval County's decision to purchase optical scan ballots that
were inaccessible to disabled voters against a challenge that the county
had violated Florida's constitutional requirement of a "direct and secret"
vote for the disabled. 84  The court recognized that Florida's
constitutional provision is ambiguous'85 and that the Florida State
Supreme Court could interpret the secrecy requirement to mean absolute
secrecy or interpret it less restrictively. 8 6 Like the Sixth Circuit, 87 the
court chose the less restrictive definition because the legislature had
interpreted the constitution to be satisfied when disabled voters were
given assistance by a third party.' 88 In a later proceeding, the District
Court for the Middle District of Florida found that the Secretary of State
violated the ADA because it was feasible for the county to purchase a
more accessible voting system.
189
In sum, the plain meaning of absolute secrecy, as defined by the
dictionary, means concealment from others that is not subject to any
restrictions. The decision of the framers to provide for absolute secrecy
in the constitution represented the strictest embrace of secrecy of any
state constitution in 1889. Yet, a historical analysis leads to the
conclusion that the Washington legislature provided an exception to
accommodate those who were incapable of voting in secrecy. In
addition, courts in other jurisdictions that have interpreted materially
181. Id. at 650.
182. Id. at 651 (citing Common Council v. Rush, 46 NW. 951, 953 (Mich. 1890)).
183. Id. at 652-53.
184. Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1282-83 (M.D. Fla.
2002) (citing FLA. CONST. art VI, § 1).
185. Id. at 1284.
186. Id.
187. See Miller, 170 F.3d at 653.
188. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87.
189. Am. Ass'n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (M.D. Fla.
2004), stay granted by 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8349 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
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similar provisions have required secrecy in voting only to the extent
feasible. However, courts that have considered this issue since the
advent of new accessible technology are divided on whether statutory
and constitutional secrecy provisions require governments to adopt the
technology to accommodate disabled persons.
IV. NOT PROVIDING A SECRET BALLOT TO ALL VOTERS TO
THE EXTENT FEASIBLE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION
Courts should interpret the Washington State Constitution to require
that the legislature provide for secrecy in voting to the extent feasible. 190
This requirement derives from the plain meaning of the constitution,
historical events from the time of ratification, and persuasive precedent
from other jurisdictions. 191 By not requiring DRE systems or other
accessible voting technologies that will provide manually impaired
voters with a secret vote, the Washington legislature failed to ensure
absolute secrecy in voting to the extent feasible, as required by the state
constitution. 
92
A. Article VI, Section 6 Requires the Legislature to Preserve Secrecy
to the Extent Feasible
The Washington State Constitution's mandate that the legislature
provide for absolute secrecy in elections requires that the legislature
provide secrecy to the extent feasible. The plain meaning and historical
evidence from the time of ratification demonstrate that the framers
wanted strict secrecy in elections. 193 The requirement of secrecy to the
extent feasible is derived from historical evidence from the time of
ratification and persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions. 194
1. The Plain Meaning ofArticle VI, Section 6 of the Washington State
Constitution Requires Strict Secrecy
An examination of the plain language-the first step in constitutional
interpretation' 95--demonstrates that article VI, section 6 requires strict
190. See infra Part IV. A.
191. See infra Part IV.A.1-.3.
192. See infra Part 1V.B.
193. See infra Part IV.A.1-.2.
194. See infra Part IV.A.2-.3.
195. Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 477, 90 P.3d 42, 45
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secrecy in voting.' 96 Definitions compiled from dictionaries published at
the time of ratification of the Washington State Constitution indicate that
the right to vote in absolute secrecy is an unconditional, exclusive right
to have one's votes cast in concealment from the observation or
knowledge of others.1 97 The Supreme Court of Washington has
interpreted "absolute" in the context of contract law in a manner
consistent with the dictionary definition. 198 Thus, the plain language of
the constitution suggests that the legislature must maintain strict secrecy
in Washington elections.
2. The Framers Intended Strict Secrecy in Elections but Washington
Permitted an Exception for Infeasibility
Historical analysis of the drafting of article VI, section 6 demonstrates
that the framers of the Washington State Constitution intended this
provision to require strict secrecy in elections. 199 However, historical
analysis also suggests that Washington recognized a limitation to
secrecy in voting when secrecy is infeasible. 200 The Washington State
Supreme Court presumes that the framers were aware of the
constitutions of other states and that their choice of stronger language
was intentional.20' In Seattle School District No. 1, the Washington State
Supreme Court held that the state had a constitutional duty to provide for
the education of its citizens, in part because the framers said that the
state's duty to provide education is "paramount," whereas other states
merely said that education should be encouraged or cherished.20
2 This
unique and strong language employed by the framers was indicative of
the framers' intent.20 3 Similarly, the framers used unique and strong
language in article VI, section 6 when they required that every voter
(2004).
196. See I THE CENTURY DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at 21 (defining absolute as "[firee from
every restriction").
197. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
198. See Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Turner, 164 Wash. 257, 263, 2 P.2d 688, 690 (1931) (citing 28
C.J. 895).
199. See Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d at 485, 90 P.3d at 49 (permitting courts to look at historical
context in determining meaning of constitutional provision).
200. See WASH. REV. CODE § 388 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240
(2004)) (permitting assistance to voters unable to vote independently).
201. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
202. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 498-99, 585 P.2d 71, 84-85 (1978).
203. See id. at 499, 585 P.2d at 85.
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have absolute secrecy in preparing and casting a ballot.20 4 The framers of
the Washington State Constitution employed the strictest voting secrecy
provision of any state.205 The use of such strong and unique language
indicates the framers' intent to require strict secrecy in Washington's
elections.
The use of stronger language in article VI, section 6 than needed to
adopt the Australian ballot demonstrates the framers' intent to require
strict secrecy. The framers' choice of the words "absolute secrecy" was
not a condition precedent for adopting the Australian ballot.20 6 A court
cannot interpret the language of article VI, section 6 as merely
expressing a desire to implement a system of secret voting-the framers
could have adopted such a system by simply requiring voting by ballot
or secret ballot. 20 7 Thus, article VI, section 6 goes further than the
Australian ballot and requires absolute secrecy, which suggests that the
framers intended a stricter level of secrecy in Washington elections.
However, Washington has historically recognized an exception to the
secrecy requirement where a secret vote is not feasible.20 8 The first
Washington legislature enacted a comprehensive ballot law in 1890 that
went to great lengths to protect secrecy. 20 9 This law also accommodated
voters who were "unable" to vote independently due to disability or
blindness by allowing them to seek the assistance of a third party in
completing their ballot.210 This 1890 accommodation law may suggest
that the framers believed that the constitutional requirement of voting in
absolute secrecy includes an outright exception that allows a third party
to assist a disabled voter in casting his or her vote. 21 1 However, the law
may also suggest that the legislature must provide voting secrecy to the
extent feasible and that third party assistance is allowed only where it is
204. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part III.B. 1.
206. Compare N.D. CONST. art. V, § 129 (amended 1978) (current version at art. 11, § 1)(providing that elections be by "secret ballot"), with 1891 N.D. Laws Ch. 66 (implementing
comprehensive Australian ballot method of voting in North Dakota's first legislative session).
207. See supra Part I11.B.2.
208. See WASH. REV. CODE § 388 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240
(2004)).
209. See Act of March 19, 1890, ch. 13, 1890 Wash. Sess. Laws 400 (codified at WASH. REV.
CODE § 363 (1891)) (providing comprehensive election law).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 388 (1891) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240
(2004)).
211. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 651 (6th Cir. 1999) (assistance to disabled is
within "ambit" of constitutional provision for secret ballot).
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not feasible for disabled voters to vote in secrecy. This latter
interpretation is more consistent with Washington State Constitution for
three reasons. First, the sweeping and comprehensive language used by
the framers suggests that strict secrecy is required in Washington
elections.212 A broad reading of article VI, section 6 that considers the
absolute secrecy requirement satisfied when a third party assists a
disabled person, even though it is feasible for these voters to vote in
secrecy, is in opposition to this strict secrecy requirement. Second,
courts in other jurisdictions historically justified assistance to disabled
persons because it was infeasible for such voters to vote without
assistance.213 Third, the Washington State Supreme Court does not
necessarily consider actions by the first legislature to be reflective of the
framers' intent.214 The election law passed by the first legislature in 1890
may not reflect the framers intent in passing article VI, section 6,215 but
instead acknowledges that Washington has historically recognized an
exception to voting in absolute secrecy when this secrecy is infeasible.
216
3. Precedent from Other Jurisdictions Suggests that Manually
Impaired Voters Are Entitled to Vote Secretly to the Extent
Feasible
Courts in other jurisdictions have historically permitted a narrow
exception to voting secrecy in cases when it is infeasible for the voter to
cast his or her ballot without assistance.217 While some courts have
found that secrecy was infeasible where voter disenfranchisement would
occur without third party assistance,218 other courts have not permitted a
breach of secrecy in cases where it was feasible for the voter to cast a
212. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., State ex rel. Braley v. Gay, 60 N.W. 676, 678 (Minn. 1894) (noting that secrecy
must be maintained "as far as possible").
214. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 514-15, 585 P.2d 71, 93 (1978)
(rejecting actions by first legislature that included members of constitutional convention as
indicative of framers' intent).
215. See id.
216. See State ex rel. Mason County Lodging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 74, 31 P.2d 539, 543
(1934) (permitting Washington State Supreme Court to consider "public history" when interpreting
Washington constitution).
217. See Gay, 60 N.W. at 678; Ellis v. May, 58 N.W. 483, 485-86 (Mich. 1894); Rogers v. Jacob,
11 S.W. 513, 514-15 (Ky. 1889); Pearson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Brunswick City, 21 S.E. 483,
485 (Va. 1895).
218. See Ellis, 58 N.W. at 485 (Mich. 1894); Smith v. Dunn, 381 F. Supp. 822, 825-26 (M.D.
Tenn. 1974).
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secret ballot. 2 19 Thus, precedent from other jurisdictions suggests that the
state must maintain secrecy in voting to the extent feasible.
Among the courts that have considered whether statutory and
constitutional voting secrecy provisions entitle manually impaired voters
to a secret vote in light of new technology, the analysis of the
Lightbourn court is most applicable to Washington.220 That court
concluded that the statutory right to vote in secret in Texas applies to the
disabled and that this right is not satisfied when disabled voters do not
have a cecret vote. 221 Federal courts have held that the Florida and
Michigan constitutional voting secrecy provisions do not require the
states to adopt accessible technology for disabled voters.222 However, the
Florida and Michigan decisions noted that the constitutional requirement
of secrecy was ambiguous and that the respective state courts could
choose from two plausible readings of the term "secret" in
constitutions.2 23 One reading requires the legislature to provide
accessible voting technology to ensure that disabled voters have a secret
224
vote. The second interpretation, adopted by these courts, is a more
lenient view of secrecy that is satisfied when disabled voters are assisted
by a third party.2 25 While this may be an accurate description of the
ambiguities in the Michigan and Florida constitutions, Washington's
constitution has a much stronger and stricter requirement of absolute
226
secrecy. 6 The framers' intent to require strict secrecy in voting, as
demonstrated by the plain language requirement of absolute secrecy and
the strong embrace of secrecy by the framers, suggests that the less
restrictive reading of the constitutional guarantee of secrecy by federal
courts in Michigan and Florida is inapposite to Washington 7.2 2 Thus, the
approach of the Lightbourn court is more appropriate to the situation in
219. See State ex rel. Edwards v. Abrams, 240 S.E.2d 643, 646 (S.C. 1978); Board v. Dill, 110 P.
1107, 1114 (Okla. 1910); Brooks v. Crum, 216 S.E.2d 220, 228 (W. Va. 1975); Grubb v. Dewing,
187 N.W. 157, 158 (N.D. 1922); McEwen v. Prince, 147 N.W. 275, 277 (Minn. 1914).
220. See Lightbourn I, 904 F. Supp. 1429, 1432 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (construing statutory voting
secrecy requirements to include disabled), rev'd on other grounds, 118 F.3d 421, 432 (5th Cir.
1997).
221. Id.
222. See Am. Ass'n of People With Disabilities v. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla.
2002); Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 653 (6th Cir. 1999).
223. Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1284; Miller, 170 F.3d at 650.
224. See Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1284; Miller, 170 F.3d at 650.
225. See Smith, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1287; Miller, 170 F.3d at 653.
226. See supra Part IV.A.1-.2.
227. See id.
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Washington.22 The holding of Lightbourn is more consistent with the
Washington State Constitution framers' intent to provide for the strictest
possible secrecy in elections.229 In addition, it is also consistent with the
rule from other jurisdictions that secrecy be maintained to the extent
feasible.23°
In sum, the Washington State Constitution requires the legislature to
provide a method of voting that maintains absolute secrecy to the extent
feasible. The plain meaning of the constitution and historical evidence of
the framers' intent indicate that the framers intended strict secrecy in
elections. Additional historical analysis and persuasive precedent from
other jurisdictions suggest that secrecy must be maintained to the extent
feasible.
B. The Washington Legislature Violates the Constitution by Failing to
Provide Manually Impaired Voters with a Secret Vote
Given that the Washington State Constitution requires that the
legislature provide a method of voting that ensures every voter absolute
secrecy to the extent feasible, the legislature is obligated to assess the
feasibility of providing accessible DRE systems to accommodate all
voters who are unable to vote in secrecy under the current election law
framework. 23 1 The legislature has fulfilled this obligation with respect to
visually impaired voters by enacting a statute that entitles visually
impaired voters to a secret vote to the extent feasible.232 However, the
Washington legislature did not include a similar provision to
accommodate manually impaired voters.233 Any voting system that
requires a voter to complete a paper ballot does not provide manually
impaired voters with a secret vote.234 As a result, every voter in
Washington who lacks the ability to complete a paper ballot must
228. See Lightbourn 1, 904 F. Supp. 1429, 1432 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 118
F.3d 421,432 (5th Cir. 1997).
229. See supra Part IV.A.1-.2.
230. See supra Part IV.A.3.
231. See supra Part IV.A.
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.12.160(2)-(3) (2004) (making secret vote for blind voters
contingent on available funding and permitting counties to comply with this requirement when they
upgrade voting technology).
233. See id. § 29A.12.160(1) (providing accessible voting for blind and visually impaired voters
but not manually impaired voters).
234. See Am. Ass'n of Disabled People v. Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(noting that only through DREs can disabled voters vote secretly and independently for first time).
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disclose his or her choices to third persons. 235 This lack of secrecy places
manually impaired voters at risk of fraud and intimidation, and in fear of
ridicule and dislike.236 This lack of secrecy also creates the possibility
that the election outcome will not reflect the true will of the people.237
The implementation of accessible DRE systems would permit
Washington's manually impaired voters to vote in secrecy for the first
time.238 The Washington Secretary of State has certified these accessible
voting devices for use by manually impaired voters in Washington State
elections.239 In fact, accessible DRE systems are currently in use in some
or all polling sites in several counties in Washington State.24 °
By not providing manually impaired voters with a secret vote to the
extent feasible, the Washington legislature has failed to comply with the
secrecy requirement of article VI, section 6. This omission violates the
constitutional obligation that article VI, section 6 imposes on the
legislature to provide for a method of voting that ensures secrecy to the
extent feasible.24' Since the Secretary of the State has approved the use
of DRE systems and federal funding is available for the purchase of new
voting technology, the legislature must require counties to provide DRE
systems for disabled voters to the extent feasible.
V. CONCLUSION
Washington election law does not provide for a secret vote for
manually impaired voters to the extent feasible despite the constitutional
235. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.44.240.
236. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 52.
237. See id. at 53 ("By thus tending to eradicate corruption and by giving effect to each man's
innermost belief, [secrecy in voting] secures to the Republic what at such a juncture is the thing
vitally necessary to its health,-a free and honest expression of the convictions of every citizen.").
238. See Shelley, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
239. See REED, supra note 28.
240. See WASH. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 41 (listing voting systems used in every county,
including DRIEs).
241. Whether it is feasible for the legislature to provide manually impaired voters with a secret
vote is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the fact that Washington has certified DREs
for use in elections, other states require DREs for disabled voters, and the federal government has
provided $62 million for new voting technology suggest it is both technologically and economically
possible for the legislature to provide manually impaired voters with a secret vote in a manner
similar to blind voters. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-379.7(d)(4) (2003) (requiring DREs be made
available for disabled voters in every precinct); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3506.19 (2005 Supp.)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 17-19-8.2(a) (2003) (requiring accessible voting technology for as many
disabled voters as possible through state of the art technology).
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requirement of absolute secrecy. The lack of a secret vote for thousands
of manually impaired Washington voters increases the potential for
fraud and improper influence in Washington elections. Technology now
exists and is certified for use in Washington that would permit manually
impaired voters to vote in secret. The plain language of the constitution,
the intent of the framers of the Washington State Constitution, and
persuasive precedent from other states suggest that article VI, section 6
requires the legislature to protect voting secrecy to the extent feasible.
By not providing a secret vote to manually impaired voters to the extent
feasible, the legislature did not comply with the requirements of article
VI, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution. In order to comply
with the constitution, the legislature must require counties to provide
accessible DRE systems to the extent feasible.
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